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Ignorance over how public policy is formed in 
lent in all spheres of activity and at all levels of decision-making. 
The Scottish Health Service is no exception. The endeavours of Wise-
man(Z) and his colleagues at the Scottish Institute for Operational 
Research have provided valuable insights into policy-making activity 
at the centre (i.e. within the Scottish Home and Health Department), 
but there remains a lack of knowledge about local policy-making 
vity in health care. Ostensibly, the fifteen area health boards in 
Scotland are the agents of the Secretary of State for Scotland, al-
though, as Bevan pointed out in 1948, there 
between authorities which are agents of a central department and 
which are merely its creatures. ( 3 ) In practice, health boards 
more discretion over resource allocation and priority-setting 
often acknowledged. Contrary to received wisdom, policy rarely emana-
tes from the centre in order to be faithfully implemented, without 
distortion, by agents in the field. This can occasionally happen; 
instance, a policy goal of a 100% institutional confinement rate for 
childbirth has all but been achieved because there exists, unusually, 
a strong consensus among resource allocators at all levels that the 
policy is the right one. More commonly, as Brown observes, 'most 
initiatives come from the grass roots - from the desire of people at 
the point of delivery for developments that would make their own 
work more useful, interesting or satisfying'. ( 4 ) Specific develop-
ments like these comprise the policy-making activities of health 
authorities and central government's involvement in the detail 
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of such allocations is almost nil. It is often more appropriate, 
therefore, to regard policy as effectively 'made' by those who imple-




Despite the persistence of inequalities ~oth geographic and those 
relating to services) after attempts by successive governments to re-
move them, studies of 
cused on the national 
policy-making in the NHS have, by and large, fo-
(i.e. United Kingdom) level. (
6
) Of course, this 
perspective is important since the centre sets the overall context in 
which the NHS and its field agents operate. However, given the persis-
tence of the imbalances and inequalities in the Service, which surely 
suggests the ability of local health authorities to subvert central 
norms and guidance, it seems odd that these authorities should have 
escaped scrutiny for so long. Certainly, the Royal Commission on the 
NHS had little to say on the matter beyond asserting that 'Ministers 
make their priorities stick'. (
7
) Observers who must face the need to 
p~sue such a hierarchical approach to policy, viewing it from the 
top down, will continue to conclude that the solution to problems of 
implementation must also proceed in a top down fashion. Policy fail-
ure will be explained by maintaining that the system is in some way 
defective, not that the whole hierarchical, policy-chain approach may 
be misconceived. Only by examining the environment in which implemen-
ters practice can a better understanding emerge of the processes ac-
tually involved. Ip the NHS, this means, inter alia, addressing issues 
and problems arising from the existence of appointed bodies respon-
sible, in large part, for determining priorities in health services. 
In particular, there are important questions concerning the accounta-
bility of these bodies to the public and concerning the ability of 
part-time lay persons to influence events which are, for the most 
part, the preserve of full-time professional officers. The remainder 
of this paper is devoted to these, and related, matters. (S) 
Health Boards: Origins 
Health boards emerged from the 1974 reorganisation of the Scott-
ish Health Service, replacing the 150 or so bodies previously respon-
sible for administering the Service. Health board members, of whom 
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there are 276 compared with over 1500 lay members serving 
authorities, are appointed by the Secretary of State for a four-year 
term, the appointments being so organised that half of the 
each board retire every two years in order to ensure continuity. App-
ointments, which can be renewed, are made 
received by the Secretary of State from a variety of interested 
including local authorities, trade unions, voluntary 
groups, churches and professional associations. Since members are not 
elected, they lack a power base in the community. They are appointed 
for their contributions as individuals and not as representatives of 
their respective nominating bodies. Members are not directly account-
able to the local community for what their board does, 
but are accountable upwards to the Secretary of State. 
The official justification for an appointment system is 
rect popular election of board members has not, in the past, met with 
any support'. (
9
) While this may be true, the assertion is not based 
on empirical evidence but on the assumption that if turnout at local 
government elections is low then it must be even lower in the event 
of elections for health authority members. A merger between health 
and local authorities has also been repeatedly ruled out. The un-
official justification for an appointment system rests on two argu-
ments: first, given that the NHS is a national service financed al-
most entirely from general taxation, it is considered, for reasons of 
financial propriety and public accountability, that the Minister 
should have direct control over what happens in the Service; and, 
second, appointing members is a useful source of patronage for a Min-
ister wishing to repay favours or reward loyalty. It should be noted, 
however, that the Minister appoints within constraints which limit 
his freedom. For instance, he is obliged to appoint members from spe-
cific groups and geographical areas. 
Although health boards were conceived primarily as management 
bodies, their precise role has become somewhat confused following the 
last Government's efforts to overcome what was widely perceived as 
management bias pervading the reorganised NHS. A document(lO) issued 
in July 1974 suggested changes designed •to make the system more re-
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sponsive to the views of those it serves and to take greater account 
of the contribution which those who work in the service can make to 
its management•. But the proposed changes did not involve any moves 
towards elected boards, amounting to little more than tinkering with 
the status quo. In an attempt to secure a better balance in the com-
position of health boards a specific number of places were allocated 
to nominees drawn from trade unions, local government and the health 
care professions and staff. The result is that about a quarter of 
the membership on each board are local government nominees, 2 or 3 
are trade union nominees, 5 have been nominated by the health care 
professions, 1 or 2 by universities and the balance (ranging from 4 
to 7) have been nominated by other bodies. 
Criticism of appointed boards centres on the fact that they are 
not really accountable to anyone and float in organisational space. 
They therefore raise disturbing questions about bow policy is formu-
lated, and priorities reached, in the health service. Cameron, (ll) 
fJr instance, argues that 'where there are scarce resources there 
will always be a problem of how best to use them. No appointed body 
can possibly say how this would best be done in a particular local-
ity•. He believes there is a danger that appointed boards may 'pay 
more attention to the occupation and amusement of professional people 
than to the health needs of the community'. (l
2
) This criticism seems 
particularly pertinent in view of the argument mentioned earlier that 
policy is quite often ~. as well as implemented, at local level, 
and also at a time when the Government is engaged in a further restr-
ucturing of the NHS intended to increase local control over services 
in order to secure a more flexible, responsive Service that is sensi-
tive to varying local needs • (l
3
) 
In practice, this means allowing local health administrators 
greater discretion and responsibility. Whereas in England a substan-
tial overhaul of the structure is envisaged to achieve this, in 
Scotland the proposed changes are more modest. They are aimed at 
simplifying the administration of the Service, principally through 
the transformation of multi-district areas into single-district areas 
by abolishing districts in most of the 10 boards which have them. The 
remaining adjustments are intended to strengthen management at unit 
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(single hospitals) and sector (group of hospitals or grouping of hos-
pitals and community services) levels. It is uncertain whether the 
present arrangement of authorities and appointments will facilitate, 
or hinder, the achievement of a more local and diverse Service. What 
is clear is that neither the composition nor the role of health boards 
has been questioned. 
Indeed s~nce 1974 there has been practically no discussion of the 
position of members of health authorities. Neither the Royal Commiss~on
on the NHS in its report nor the Government in its consultative paper 
on the future shape of the Scottish Health Service consider this matt-
er and both endorse existing practice. Greater awareness of members• 
difficulties is shown by a review(l4 ) of the working of the NHS under-
taken at the request of the Royal Commission. What this study, and my 
own research, (lS) show is that more important, perhaps, than the argu-
ments over election versus selection (including control of the NHS by 
local government), which continue to exercise the minds of critics of 
the undemocratic nature of the NHS, is the problem of whether members 
are able to perform satisfactorily the role prescribed for them and 
whether, in fact, this role is one for which members are best suited. 
The performance by members of their functions suggests that neither 
an appointment system nor a system of elections makes, or would make, 
a great deal of difference to the final outcome although a system of 
elections may be a desirable reform in itself, particularly in secur-
ing the legitimacy of health authorities. The difficulties local coun-
cillors face in asserting control over services for which they are 
supposedly publicly accountable warn against such easy assumptions. {l6 ) 
Usually, though by no means always, it is the officials who are the 
major influence on policy-making. To confine discussion to the means 
by which health board members find themselves on boards is to over-
look the problems they face in making sense of their prescribed role. 
My observations of two health boards (hereafter referred to as 
Alpha and Beta)(l
7
) revealed numerous constraints which hindered a 
full realisation of members' potential. These may be grouped under 
four headings: (1) the composition and functions of boards; (2) 
their organisation; (3) the demands on members; and (4) the rela-
tionship between members and officers. 
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(1) Composition and Functions 
Since the 1974 reorganisation of the NHS, the role of board mem-
bers has been conceived primarily as a policy-making, rather than as 
a representative, one. This remains the case despite attempts, mention-
ed earlier, to blur the distinction. Membership is essentially arrang-
ed on the basis of individual management ability (defined broadly in 
terms of monitoring the activities of chief officers) as opposed to 
interest representation. Therefore, members have a managerial role in 
their policy-making and monitoring activities, while executive manage-
ment rests with officers at area and district levels. Since reorganisa-
tion, and because of it, much decision-making responsibility has been 
delegated to officers which previously rested with members of former 
Boards of ManagemeJt.JBoMs). Chief officers operate as members of con-
sensus management teams and it is largely in these forums that policy 
is made and priorities are set. A consequence of this is that members 
often receive recommendations that have all but been decided and which 
carry too much professional support to be deeply challenged. Members 
really only influence events on the rare occasions when the management 
team is divided. Then authority members act collectively as arbiter. 
It is, in any case, physically impossible for the small number of 
health boards to take, or explicitly confirm, the same number of de-
cisions as their predecessors. On any count, the points at which im-
portant decisions involving lay members are made with regard to the 
local operation of health services have been drastically reduced. There 
are only fifteen key points of decision-making which involve lay mem-
bers and these are located at area level, while districts (which exist 
in ten of the boards) are run solely by teams of officers whose mem-
bers are individually accountable to their area counterparts. 
Table 1 shows the breakdown of membership among the various groups 
entitled to nominate members to boards (in this case Alpha and Beta). 
As already mentioned, members are not drawn entirely from outside the 
NHS, but include a high proportion of health care professionals who, 
in theory at any rate, are present in a personal capacity and not as 
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~: 1 Numbers exclude chairmen o£ boards 
2 Normally there is (as above) 1 member from 
the regional local authority and 1 from each 





Health board chairmen are part-time and receive a part-time 
for their services. Ordinary members are also part-time but serve 
a voluntary basis, receiving only allowances for attendances 
ings. The majority o£ members on Alpha and Beta, as on other boards, 
were males in their middle-age or over, the average age being 
the mid-fifties. Nominees coming under the last column in the table 
came from a wide variety o£ backgrounds and some o£ the appointments 
reflected the nature o£ the area served by a particular board. Most 
boards had a token housewife and usually two or three o£ the members 
were retired. 
A health board's purpose, as officially defined, is 
'major policy, strategic planning decisions, the broad allocation o£ 
resources and matters o£ substantial interest to the community', (l8 ) 
while officers, as noted, have delegated to them a wide range o£ 
wers to make decisions without having to refer them to the board 
approval, as well as implementing those decisions which must be re-
ferred to the board. Even the strategic policy-making role reserved 
for board members will be largely influenced by the kinds o£ informa-
tion supplied by officers. The overall effect o£ these arrangements 
has been to contract considerably the role o£ board members and to 
expand greatly the role o£ officers. In practice, this can mean that 
lay members are restricted to a policy-approving and monitoring 
leaving detailed management and the formulation o£ policy to officers.
Given the difficulty o£ setting specific objectives in the NHS and 
lack o£ satisfactory measures o£ output, the monitoring function in 
particular has confounded many members. Activities cannot be moni 
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unless there is agreement on what they are intended to achieve. 
Evidence obtained from Alpha and Beta (and supported by data from 
elsewhere) suggests that members experienced great difficulty in id-
entifying with the official rather broad, and vague, definition o£ 
their role, and in ascertaining precisely what was expected o£ them 
in performing it. Many were critical"-\')£ their role for two reasons: 
(a) because o£ a lack o£ involvement in decision-making and (b) be-
cause a great deal o£ decision-making over resources and priorities 
had been taken out o£ their hands and placed in officers' hands. A 
common complaint was that health boards were little more than 'rubber-
stamping' agencies. An observer o£ the reorganised NHS in England 
wrote that authority members 'experienced a fleeting impression o£ 
being trapped in a web spun by theorists and management consul tants.<
19
) 
Members o£ Scottish health boards have experienced _similar impress-
ions, though perhaps not so fleeting. 
The official view o£ the member's role is that although boards 
will on occasion be concerned with detail, this would be selective 
and not general. Health boards, according to a senior official in 
the SHHD, had to avoid becoming 'enveloped in a welter o£ detail'. 
In this, he was recalling the argument first put forward in a report 
which appeared in 1966 and foreshadowed many o£ the management prac-
tices that later found their way into the reorganised NHS. ( 20) The 
report attempted to make a clear-cut distinction between the activi-
ty o£ policy-making on the one hand and that o£ administration on 
the other by clarifying the respective roles and functions o£ members 
and their officers. 'Only i£ boards concentrate their attention on 
the wider issues and delegate to officers the maximum degree o£ res-
ponsibility, while retaining their £unction o£ overall direction and 
control' will the best use o£ resources be achieved. ( 2 l) It was hoped, 
indeed intended, that the relative roles o£ members and their officers 
would move in the direction o£ the relationship between Ministers and 
civil servants. 
Few members interviewed were clear about what was meant by the 
terms 'major policy'• 'strategic planning decisions', or 'the broad 
allocation o£ resources'. When pressed to define what they understood 
by them, most members referred to capital schemes or to projects in-
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volving some physical, or institutional, development. The association
between planning and capital schemes was also noted by Hallas in his 
study of community health council members in England. His remarks are
equally applicable to health board members. He wondered why it was 
that very often council members and officers discuss 
'planning' as if it was all about buildings? Time after 
time, especially when 'strategy' documents are debated, 
the talk centres around the provision of new accommo-
dation, the possibilities of change of use of buildings, 
and the probabilities of closures. It rarely happens that 
a member of a study group of the council remarks that 
planning is more a question of rearranging services to 
the patient or client.{22) 
Similarly, in their review of the working of the NHS, noted above, a 
research team found a tendency among respondents (including health 
authority members) 'to confuse planning of capital projects with the 
whole planning operation ... •. ( 23 ) 
Apart from apparent confusion over terminology as to what con 
stituted planning, members partly focused on new buildings because 
they liked to see things get done. What better indication could be 
given of their ability to develop the Service in an area than the es-
tablishment of a new District General Hospital, or maternity unit, or 
whatever. Developments like these were highly visible, whereas with 
community care services which, arguably, are in much greater need of 
development, the opposite situation obtains, improvements in this 
sphere, like employing more health visitors, having a low profile 
and the benefit to the patient by increasing staff establishments 
being difficult to measure and to visualise. 
A further aspect of the inability of members to feel at ease 
with a broad policy-making remit might be that, apart from capital 
projects {which form only a part of planning activity), Alpha and 
Beta did not indulge in much conscious policy-making. In the words of 
one medical member, 'there is no conscious planning process in the 
NHS - priorities are buried within "shopping lists" of developments 
and deficiencies and board members have little role to play in de-
cisions of this nature'. A board Secretary shared these views: 
'there aren't enough policy decisions to make it worth their (i.e. 
board members') while'. This had led to problems in finding suffi-
cient work for the board and in Beta {probably elsewhere too) agendas 
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for board meetings were occasionally 'manufactured' in order to occupy 
members. 
If board members experienced role confusion, then health board 
chairmen and officers had even greater difficulty in defining a board1s 
role in any but the vaguest of terms. The Secretary of Beta thought 
that the term 'policy-making' had not been defined and nor had the 
role of members. 'It might have been useful if the Department had 
given board members a job description ..•• Board members are asking 
what are we here for ••• It's very difficult'. The chairman of Beta 
explained that he would put under the term policy 'almost everything 
because it does tend to percolate up {from the districts, to the area, 
to the board)'. But this chairman, along with many board members from 
both boards, was concerned at his lack of involvement in the forma-
tion of policy. 'It has been troubling me for some time that we were 
not really formulating any policies at all'. There were numerous ex-
planations for this state of affairs, many of which lay outwith the 
board's competence. For example, the board had inherited commitments 
to projects from the pre-1974 authorities; there were the cuts in 
the growth rate of the NHS; and there were the policies which the 
SHHD was imposing on health boards, for example, the setting up of a 
family planning service and the implementation of the junior doctors' 
pay award. Boards were obliged to comply with these. Members of Alpha 
and Beta, with one or two exceptions, experienced a general feeling 
of impotence. When the SHHD published its memorandum on priorities 
in 1976, it was received enthusiastically by many members for it pro-
vided them for the first time with guidelines and criteria,albeit 
rather general, by which to measure progress in their respective 
boards. ( 24 ) 
Part of the confusion about functions lay in members reluc-
tance, or outright refusal, to accept or adhere to the managerial 
overtones of the role as officially prescribed with its emphasis on 
broad policy-making. This was acutely evident among those members who 
had been members of health authorities before reorganisation when 
their role had been indisputably a representative one and one that 
involved them in considerable detail. Because Boards of Management 
controlled and managed either a single hospital or group of hospitals 
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on behalf of the Regional Hospital Boards, the scale of operation en-
abled members to become closely involved in the detailed operation of 
hospitals. In addition, the system of 'house' committees operated by 
many boards encouraged members to intervene in decisions of day-to-
day management. Members concerned themselves with a range of highly 
specific, and fairly minor, matters. For example, one committee was 
shown a counterpane which had shrunk to half its proper size - it was 
resolved to investigate the matter; on another occasion, a committee 
resolved that a boiler-house pipe which had burst frequently should 
be lagged or boxed to prevent a recurrence. Much of the time of boards 
and committees was taken up with similar matters. This is precisely 
the sort of detail which health board members are now expected to 
leave to,officers to handle. 
However, adjusting to a new conception of the member's role has 
not been easy. A health board member with long experience of health 
service administration commented: 
Members have a different function now and not, so far, one 
which I have found rewarding in comparison with the old 
BoM. As far as I can see, the health board is a 'rubber 
stamp' rather than an active participant .••• I don't 
find my role now rewarding - I'm too far away from the 
people on the ground ..•• I'm frustrated, I'm not 
contributing a great deal at the moment. In the old 
set-up I did feel that we got our teeth into things 
and we were near the grass roots. 
Another member doubted whether a fairly rigid separation between 
policy and day-to-day administration was helpful. 
-It's awfully easy to say that the executive groups at 
area and district levels should be involved in the de-
tail but I think it could be a bad situation if we stuck 
strictly to the letter of our remit and confined our-
selves to a policy-making role. I don't think we 
could possibly have the knowledge to be policy-makers 
without being involved at a lower level ••.. 
A consultant member believed that the policy-making role for members 
had two disadvantages: (a) a member lacked full knowledge of any 
problem; and (b) a member was, of necessity, dependent on officers 
for information. Invariably, the recommendations of the area execu-
tive group (AEG) were accepted by members with little discussion or 
probing. It was, claimed this member, very difficult to do otherwise. 
166 
'If members want to influence decision-making then it's not sufficient 
for them to read agendas, minutes and attend meetings'. It was not 
easy for members to perform a policy-making role without detailed in-
formation and knowledge of a particular problem, or development. How-
ever, in acquiring such in-depth knowledge there was a risk that mem-
bers would stray into areas which were labelled day-to-day administra-
tion and, therefore, strictly the responsibility of officers. Where 
to strike a balance between the two extremes of complete detachment 
and complete involvement was not easy to decide. 
The role of members in the allocation of development funds ill-
ustrates some of the frustration they felt and shows how easy it was 
for them simply to rubber-stamp decisions effectively taken elsewhere. 
Each year a board receives funds for developments (i.e. growth money) 
which can be used for improving or expanding existing services or for 
starting new ones. Health boards must decide how they want to allocate 
these funds which are never sufficient to meet all claims upon them. 
In Alpha and Beta, the allocation process surrounding development 
funds for new staff was dominated by a small number of key actors who 
determined how the funds were to be spent. This group was comprised 
of officers at area and district levels and it was their task to ass-
emble the list of proposed allocations that went before the board for 
approval. Although board members were presented with an opportunity to 
query proposals for new staff, it was in practice difficult for them 
to do so since they were not conversant with the background to each 
development request. The allocation process was structured in such a 
way that it insulated the key decision-makers from lay involvement. 
All meetings over development funds prior to the boards' pro forma 
acceptance of the final package were conducted in private. In addi-
tion, requests for funds were not generated from within the board but, 
in most cases, were demands from staff which were transmitted up the 
management hierarchy to area level. Therefore, the operation of the 
resource allocation process in regard to development funds safe-
guarded those with discretion (i.e. the officers) from public demands, 
as expressed through board members, and from visibility. The process 
was further obscured through the practice of presenting members with 
a shopping-list of deficiencies with no explanation of their origin 
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or importance. Members had no idea whether the proposed developments 
placed before them were vital to the achievement of board priorities 
or whether they might be detrimental to their attainment. Nor were 
members given alternatives, where possible, to the proposed develop-
ments. Of course, members were free to probe these matters and insist 
upon more and better information but, given their generally weak posi-
tion, they were reluctant to do so. It might have been different, how-
ever, if they had been positively encouraged to ensure that develop-
ment requests were in line with board priorities instead of being ex-
cluded from this exercise and kept in ignorance. Some possible re-
forms are considered later in the paper. 
At the centre of all these difficulties is the possibility that 
the policy-making role itself may be based on a misconception. Hay-
wood maintains that 'the view of them (i.e. board members) as policy 
makers, thirsting to choose between options presented to them by offi-
cers may influence management structures but it hardly matches either 
the abilities or preferences of many public representatives•. ( 2S) It 
was clear from members' own conceptions of their role that, while a 
few might pay 'lip-service' to its policy-making dimension, most in 
fact performed their functions differently, often undertaking the 
kinds of tasks that the former BoMs undertook and which local health 
councils were established to undertake. As mentioned already, many 
members, especially those with previous experience of the NHS, felt 
insufficiently involved in their authorities' decision-making. Mem-
bers, naturally enough, liked to make a positive contribution and see 
the results of their efforts in direct, practical ways. Partly to 
overcome feelings of remoteness and to familiarise members with the 
services and facilities under their supervision, Alpha and Beta (and 
other boards) organised visiting programmes to hospitals, clinics, 
health centres and so on. A visiting programme was considered to be 
essential in enabling members to carry out their strategic policy-
making role in an informed manner. However, for members either un-
sure of, or unenthusiastic about, their role, the visiting programme 
was perceived rather differently and as more than an educational de-
vice. Members predisposed towards the sorts of tasks performed by 
members of BoMs, outlined earlier, found visits a way of becoming in-
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volved in detail. In Beta, the visiting programme was revised to en-
able particular individuals to concentrate on particular institutions 
and to act as intermediaries between them and the board. While this 
was an appropriate arrangement for a BoM, doubts were expressed about 
its applicability to health boards where an overview of the area and 
its services was deemed to be necessary. There was a possibility, 
therefore, that visits could encourage members to press the interests 
of a particular ward or clinic at the expense of other wards or clin-
ics which were suffering from similar deficiencies. The vice-chairman 
of Beta conceded that members on visits were 'inclined to learn about 
the bits they were walking round'. They would pick on the deficiencies 
because this is what the local staff expected you to do. 
They took you to places where they wanted you to see 
something. The visit was an opportunity for staff to 
show board members things they (i.e. the staff) were 
complaining about. The tendency was to go back to the 
board and raise the matter there, whereas board members 
should have been scanning the picture as a whole and 
trying to see how it fitted into the general health 
board set-up. 
Up to a point, visiting programmes were a throwback to past prac-
tices when members of BoMs were in and but of hospitals regularly. Of 
course, health board visits were on a much larger scale both geogra-
phically and in terms of services which had to be visited although 
visits to hospitals continued to dominate the programmes. 
Members, on the whole, found it difficult to refrain from re-
presenting a particular view or group, and some were of the opinion 
that this was what a member ~be doing. Clearly, the way in 
which the appointment system operates makes it hard to visualise how, 
or why, members should think otherwise. After reviewing the range of 
interests entitled to submit nominations, Brown(
26
) concluded that •it 
hardly seems likely that this will throw up groups who will be able 
to look sectional· interests in the face and decide what is best for 
patients. Membership will be on the basis of interest representation 
rather than management ability'. Comments from members support this 
assertion. One member of Alpha said: 'I know one's not meant to re-
present one's own area, but one is bound to stand up for one's area 
on certain occasions. Inevitably one knows more about it than anywhere 
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else'. This was an important consideration when it was 'beyond any-
one's capacity really to take an overall view (of the service)'. An-
other member observed 
You tend at times to say "I can't make a contribution 
to the total object of the service in the whole area, 
therefore I'll try to make a contribution to a part of 
it" - the part you are residing in and about which you 
can get real information. 
Apart from the potential for geographical specialisation, there was 
also scope for functional specialisation. Certain members had leanings
towards particular services. This was obviously true of medical and 
nursing members. A few members with previous knowledge of the NHS ten-
ded to be hospital oriented, while some local authority members saw 
themselves as spokesmen for particular community interests. The ten-
dency for members to represent areas or interests can partly be e~ 
plained on the grounds that in a state of general ignorance, they con-
fined their attention, quite understandably, to the familiar, that is, 
to places and/or services about which they already knew something. 
After all, members receive no training or formal preparation for 
their tasks. It is simply a matter of learning 'on the job'. Like 
that of the councillor, the health board member's job is one which 
is learned by doing, and there is li tt·le effort made to facilitate 
the process by advance preparation. Consequently, the job depends 
heavily upon what a member decides to make of it, if anything. 
Some officers maintained that members could not be prepared for 
their role since working patterns had to evolve between members and 
officers in each board and these would naturally differ. Nevertheless, 
at least one member of Alpha was of the opinion that more could be 
done to assist new members by, for example, running in-service cour-
ses at which members could be introduced to the various types of in-
formation they would be dealing with, and making use of, in reaching 
decisions. New members, in particular, revealed in interviews that 
they had to resort to 'whispering, and asking, and running to some-
one and wondering what's this all about? Who do you run to? Another 
board member? Or to the Secretary? They (i.e. members) may be afraid 
to seek assistance in case they reveal their ignorance•. The view 
expressed by one experienced member probably summed up what the 
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majority felt. 
There is a difficulty in health matters in that so much 
of it is clinical, technical - the terminology used and 
the graphs and charts produced for us which, if we were 
honest with ourselves, would prompt us to ask where are 
we going, is this bad, is this good, is it to be altered 
and, if so, how? I find it extremely difficult to cope. 
We call for information and a lot of it is a little be-
yond our understanding. 
Members were reluctant to divulge whether or not those without a pro-
fessional background on boards deferred to professional members. Yet 
there were obvious divisions and imbalances present in the very com-
position of boards. A medical member of Alpha admitted that he felt 
at an advantage over lay members. 'It must be extremely difficult for 
them to cope .•• The complexities of the NHS make it very difficult 
for an uninformed member to understand issues or to make an effective 
contribution'. Even if such deference is not overt, it can exist in 
other, more covert, ways. For example, some members felt inhibited 
at meetings and were reluctant to articulate their views in the pre-
sence of professional members. 
(2) Organisation of Health Boards 
The operation of the two health boards- the timetable of meet-
ings, their frequency and duration, the existence and membership of 
standing committees- had an impact on members' performance. The 
procedure adopted by Alpha was to meet in full each month while Beta 
met bi-monthly principally because the amount of business did not 
justify monthly meetings. Attendance at board meetings was generally 
high but if a member does not attend over a period of six months or 
so, the Secretary is empowered to discover the reasons for the pro-
longed absence. 
Full board meetings are open to the public and the press, al-
though, on occasion, a board will go into committee if delicate 
matters are under discussion. The system of standing committees wtich 
boards have is a useful means of bypassing public scrutiny. Some 
members justified the existence of the committees on the pretext 
that people are more restricted when the press and public are pre-
sent. In the event, most of the work of both boards was done in 





making angle than full board meetings were the standing committees. 
Guidance from the SHHD on committee structure envisaged a policy 
and resources committee (PRC} and general practitioner service comm-
ittees. The PRC, because of its remit, would become the board's major 
committee. The idea was that -'Policy', embracing the planning of in-
tegrated services including priorities for capital programmes, and 
'Resource Allocation•, covering finance and staff, should be brought 
together into one committee in order to facilitate coordination and 
budgeting. These developments were akin to those resulting from iocal 
government reform in the mid-1970s. 
The PRC's main tasks were to: (a) decide broad area policies 
and priorities in the light of information produced by the area e.x-
ecutive group; (b) approve budgets and short-and long-term plans be-
fore these were submitted to the Secretary of State; (c) approve the 
allocation of financial and manpower resources among services and dis-
tricts within the area and to review the overall effectiveness of 
health provision; (d) review the performance and adequacy of ser-
vices within the area in the light of reports from the AEG or from ad 
hoc committees of the board; and (e) take particular major decisions 
over and above the routine (e.g. a hospital closure) and decisions 
specifically affecting the provision of services provided by matching 
local authorities or adjoining health boards. The second main stand-
ing committee, which most boards, including Alpha and Beta, had es-
tablished although this had not been recommended in guidance from the 
SHHD, was responsible for: (a) appointing senior officers and senior 
clinicians in accordance with procedures laid down nationally; (b) 
approving arrangements for training and recruiting staff; (c) app-
roving arrangements for dealing with staff appeals; and (d) approv-
ing arrangements for consultations with staff. 
Of the two committees, the PRC was where members could, poten-
tially, make a significant contribution to decision-making. Whereas 
full board meetings could be cumbersome affairs, with twenty odd mem-
bers present, plus the four chief officers, and other individuals in 
attendance by invitation, which occurred in the public gaze, meetings 
of the PRC were more intimate gatherings where business was conducted 
well away from public scrutiny. By the time proposals reached the 
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board for approval, they would have already been thrashed out, or 
quietly accepted, by the PRC. Board members were aware that the PRC 
was the most important component of a board's decision-making appara-
tus and that it was largely responsible for what was put up to, and 
finally approved by, the full board. In the words of Beta's vice-
chairman, 'in practice the PRC is the more important (of the two comm-
ittees), in theory no. One should be talking about money, the other 
about.people. But you can do nothing without money'. Often, certain 
items would not go beyond the PRC unless a member wished to raise a 
matter at a board meeting that had already been considered, and app-
roved, by the PRC. 
The significance of the PRC in decision-making led to problems 
concerning the shape of committee structure a board should have, and 
the relationships of committees to the board. Powerful committees 
like the PRC added to feelings of isolation and remoteness among some 
of the members who were not also members of these committees. As one 
board member put it: 
if you're not on the PRC, it's more difficult for a board 
member to put forward his view. You're at a disadvantage. 
The major decisions are taken in this committee - (it is) 
where priorities are (set), where the money is allocated. 
While it's true that these things come to the board in the 
form of a minute, people who're not on the PRC have got 
to have a strong point of view backed by local knowledge 
if they're to question the proposals in any serious way .•. 
But there is a dilemma. Short of having everyone on the 
PRC I don't see any way round this (problem) •••• The 
fact remains that if you're not on the PRC I don't think 
one is fully involved. 
Therefore, while there were sound reasons for establishing a 
PRC, one of the effects of having such a committee was to concentrate 
business in its hands and to limit discussion at full board meetings. 
In the words of one Secretary, 'the PRC is virtually the health board 
in all but name•. In both Alpha and Beta, a second standing committee 
was established to placate board members who were not on the PRC. 
Some means had to be found to occupy them since many felt a need to 
become more closely involved in the running of the health service 
than a brief monthly, or bi-monthly, board meeting allowed. The solu-








though it was questionable how necessary it was beyond performing a 
symbolic role for members. Its only real value was in providing new 
members with an opportunity to 'cut their teeth' before graduating 
to the more important work of the PRC. 
Alpha and Beta had different selection procedures for committee 
membership. In Alpha, the AEG put up names for a range of activities, 
including committees,for which members were required. The Secretary 
played an important part in the selection process for committees (a 
method chosen by board members themselves) and, inevitably, this gave 
him considerable influence over their composition. Board members were 
free to reject the names put forward but they had never done this. 
New board members were not, as a rule, appointed to the PRC. They 
'found their feet' on the second committee. This arrangement tended 
to emphasise, however unintentionally, the fact that there were 
differences in status between the two committees with the PRC being 
the more important of the two. 
In Beta, selection for committee membership was undertaken by a 
Special Purposes Committee, comprising the chairman, vice--chairman, 
and the two convenors of the standing committees. As the vice-chairman 
observed, 'there is no democracy about it 1 • Membership was decided on 
aptitude, although if someone expressed a preference for one commi-
ttee rather than the other, then his or her wishes would be met if 
at all possible. 
The committee structures of Alpha and Beta were important ele-
ments in determining the extent to which a board member could contri-
bute to the development of the Service in the area under his jurisdic-
tion. It mattered a great deal which committee a member was on, since 
only the PRC was of importance when it came to resource-allocation and 
priority-setting ~atters. This was where the 'spade-work' was done, 
and where 'the basic questions (concerning) the development of the 
service and the resources available were raised'. As one member ex-
pressed it, 'this is where the real meat of the decision-making pro-
cess may be found'. Obviously much depended on the calibre of the mem-
bers themselves - their personal qualities, experience, skills and 
enthusiasm for the task were all important factors. But the struc-
tural framework within which board members operated was also importan~ 
174 
For example, if a keen, active member was not, for whatever reason, a 
member of the PRC, then the opportunities open to him to make a contri-
bution to the board's activities were somewhat diminished. As mention-
ed, the system was flexible and could accommodate those with particu-
lar skills and interests. But as a further constraint operating on 
members, particularly new ones, it is worth noting. 
Finally,mention should be made of programme planning committees 
which have been established by health boards usually as sub-committees 
of the PRC. They were not studied in Alpha and Beta since they were in 
the process of being set up. Their· purpose is to assist boards in the 
formulation of long term policies for particular services, like pri-
mary care, and for certain care groups, like the elderly and mentally 
ill. Membership is multidisciplinary and includes two board members, 
one of whom is normally chairman. In an examination of these committ-
ees in the Greater Glasgow Health Board, Boddy reports that 'over-
whelmingly, the impression gained was of a group of people who were 
dissatisfied with the way the committees were working, and with the 
results obtained'. ( 27 ) 
(3) Demands on Members 
The demands upon board members are greater than those that were 
placed upon their predecessors on the pre-1974 authorities. This is 
principally because the responsibilities of members have expanded 
with integration (members are now responsible for primary care ser-
vices, e.g. general practitioners, dentists, pharmacists and opticians, 
and community care services, e.g. maternity and child welfare, health 
visiting and community nursing, in addition to the hospital service) 
and there has been a sharp reduction in the number of lay people runn-
ing the Health Service; in one board, for example (not Alpha or Beta), 
there are 21 lay members responsible for the services in the area 
whereas prior to reorganisation there were 159 lay members responsible 
for fewer services. 
The role of board chairman differs from that of ordinary board 
members as well as carrying with it extra responsibilities. The chair-
men of Alpha and Beta took the view that it would be wrong for them to 
interfere in the work of the officers who ought to be left alone to 
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run the services. However, both saw themselves as more involved in ad-
ministrative activity than ordinary members. The Secretary in each 
board fixed the agendas for board and committee meetings but the chair-
men approved them and often suggested items for inclusion. 
Apart from the personal qualities members possessed, what dictat-
ed the degree of involvement in health board affairs above all was 
the time at the disposal of members. Few were in a position to give 
up vast amounts of this precious commodity to health board business 
even if they had wanted to do so. The amount of time a member could 
spare for such work determined, to a large extent, whether that mem-
ber became heavily involved in board business or whether he remained 
on the periphery. Depending upon what a member made of his role, and 
how conscientious he was in performing it, it could be a time-consuming 
activity. Local authority members, for instance, might express a deep 
interest in certain health care issues, but the time they could spare 
in order to pursue these interests in greater depth was strictly limit-
ed because of other commitments. 
Estimates of the time spent by members on health board business 
are not especially useful since practice varies so widely. Members 
are not required to spend a specific amount of time on board work. 
Farquharson-Lang produced some figures on time spent by BoM members 
on various duties, but these are not applicable to health board mem-
bers with different tasks. However, for what it is wor.th, the Farqu-
harson-Lang report recommended that, on a monthly basis, the maximum 
amount of time that members should be expected to devote to their 
duties should not exceed twelve hours. ( 2S) For smaller boards, the 
time expected should be well below the recommended limits. 
In the case of health boards, at a minimum there was the pure 
business side - board meetings and committee meetings, all of which 
involved some homework in the form of reading background papers. Each 
member was on one of the two main standing committees. Beyond these 
commitments, some members took on heavier workloads, including sitting 
on appointment committees, service committees, special sub-committees 
and programme planning committees. In addition, there were the numer-
ous visits to institutions which took place each month, designed to 
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familiarise members with the services in their area. There was also 
the public relations function which involved members in social engage-
ments such as the opening of a hospital, or ward. The demands on mem-
bers' time could, therefore, be negligible or quire considerable. A 
member could perform his tasks with a minimum of advance preparation 
(simply glancing through papers the night before a meeting), or he 
could probe deeply into certain issues that interested him, or caught 
his attention. The average member would probably spend half a day each 
month on the board meeting; half a day each month on one of the stand-
ing committees; and with various other duties he could spend an addi-
tional one to one-and-a-half days per month, making a total of around 
two days each month for board business. Beyond this, there would be 
the read ng of minutes, reports and background papers. Of course, 
some members spent more time than others on board work, and this often 
depended on whether they were retired, and therefore had more time at 
their disposal, or whether they were local authority members, say, in 
which case the chances were that they did not become much involved in 
health board business. 
(4) Relationships between Members and Officers 
The atmosphere and operations of a board are determined to a 
large extent by the~nds of relationships which exist between members 
and officers. Haywood suggests that this is a problem in most public 
authorities but that in the NHS it is exacerbated by the power of the 
doctors. 
It is a very brave member who will challenge requests 
for additional consultant appointments or expensive 
technology or new acute units even if it is rea~ised that 
such developments often produce comparatively marginal 
improvements in health status and only continue to denude 
Cinderella services of resources.(29) 
Members of Alpha and Beta were understandably reluctant to criticise 
officers or to disagree with the line they took on policy issues. In 
fact, most headed in the opposite direction, praising officers for 
their efficiency and for their willingness to assist members with 
problems or queries. However, beneath the surface charm, there exis-
ted frictions and tensions. 









commitments elsewhere, are advised by teams of full-time professional 
managers, it happens naturally that officers, ostensibly the servants, 
quietly become the masters. Members, inevitably, are heavily 
on them for information, guidance and assistance. The relationship 
ges on the parasitic rather than the symbiotic. The vice-chairman 
Beta said that 'accusations that all the health board is doing is 
rubber-stamping schemes evblved by the AEG are to some extent •.. true'. 
After all, 
the officers know the needs and the background of their 
own staff. This happens mainly in development schemes. 
Unless a board member is prepared to do a lot of leg-work, 
visiting sites and talking to people, he's in no position 
to originate schemes himself, so the work will come to us 
from the AEG who in turn get it from the district executive 
group. I take these statements at their face value. 
The vice-chairman of Alpha expressed similar views. 
Our function as a board is to discuss policy. We do this 
with the assistance of the executive group (of officers) 
and 99.9% of the time we agree with and accept their 
advice because we are not knowledgeable enough to say 
that a particular scheme should have priority. 
All members interviewed perceived the relationship with officers in 
similar terms - it was one marked by dependence and, hopefully, trust 
and confidence. The relationship was not a conspiratorial one, with 
officers plotting and scheming behind members' backs 
ly pushing proposals through the various committees. There was no 
to resort to Machiavellian tactics when the system so favoured the 
professional managers. 
Some board members maintained that boards could be more effecti 
and the imbalance between members and officers redressed,if a number 
of changes were introduced. One chairman said 
there was a tendency for us just to see things that they 
(i.e. officers) had decided on and not always to see the 
•things they had rejected. We weren't always terribly clear 
of their reasons for selecting some things and rejecting 
others. I have asked that in future we get more detail 
of the way in which the process works out, particularly 
so far as objectives are concerned so that we have some 
knowledge of what these are. 
A number of members wanted to see a greater range of options 
to them to enable them to reach a decision, as opposed to the board 
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being a rather placid bystander to what often turned out to be a fait 
accompli. In the words of one member, 
the AEG prepare papers for the board having talked it 
(i.e. the matter requiring a decision) out and having 
heard all sides of the argument, but there may have been 
a strong argument put up on the other side which board 
members might be tending towards but because they have 
not heard the other side of the argument they feel that 
the experts know best. You really haven't heard all 
sides of the argument because the papers arrive at one 
conclusion rather than present a range of options. 
Discussions within the executive groups are lost to 
board members. I£, as a board member, you have reser-
vations about the argument that's being put before 
you, you mask your reservations in temerity because 
you feel here is all the expertise favouring this 
particular argument and you don't know that there 
may have been an alternative that supports your view. 
Or, maybe not having heard another argument, you're 
agreeing to what's there, whereas had you heard the 
other argument you might have been in favour of it. 
Papers present the ideal and an alternative but it's 
the ideal that's built up and the alternative which 
is without back-up. It's not entirely the fault of 
the executive group. We, as board members, don't ask 
enough questions concerning back-up information. 
There are those, like Haywood, who favour opening up decision-making 
in health authorities and making options more explicit. There are di-
fficulties associated with such a strategy such as slower decision-
making (although possibly more effective in the long run), and the 
danger of information overload. Haywood would like to see 'members 
and senior o££icers •.. open up the conflicts inherent in the choice of 
local priorities and invite argument from interested parties rather 
than obscure them by presenting a list of proposals as is so often 
done at the moment.•(
3
0) As noted earlier, this problem is certainly 
evident in development fund allocations, where lists of staffing re-
quests are presented to a health board for approval, the decisions on 
which categories to develop having already effectively been taken by 
the officer groups at area and district levels. Board members confront-
ed with these lists experience extreme difficulty in trying to deter-
mine where the board's priorities lie. Yet, staffing developments are 
important when over 75% of total NHS expenditure goes on salaries and 







Service as a whole moves and decisions on staffing are a commitment on 
future resources. For example, if more domiciliary nurses and health 
visitors are appointed and fewer hospital nurses in acute services, 
then it is possible to argue that a board's priorities lie in the 
community care sector. But these priority decisions tend to remain 
implicit and are rarely made explicit. ( 3 l) 
Despite feelings of frustration, dissatisfaction and occasional 
impotence, board members were united (not surprisingly) in their view 
that some form of lay input in NHS administration was desirable and 
that it would be quite wrong to run the Service with just officers 
accountable to the Secretary of State. According to one member, 
if you abolished health boards and left it to the 
officials I 1 ve no doubt that for the majority of cases 
for a majority of the time you wouldn't notice any 
difference. Whether itts a desirable practice in the 
long run is another matter. On balance, with something so 
close to people's needs as the NHS, I agree with the 
principle of lay involvement. There is no other serious 
alternative. 
In other words, the board acted as a check on officialdom and was a 
counterweight to what would otherwise be a totally closed system. 
The vice-chairman of Beta claimed the board was essential in a purely 
practical sense. 'The AEG still needs somebody to hold the balance 
(i.e. to act as umpire or arbiter). If we weren't there, they'd have 
to invent a chief executive or a committee in (the Scottish Office?. 
One of the chairmen believed that 'there has to be an avenue where 
you pick up what is wrong with the Service •••. Health board members 
have an outsider's "finger on the pulse" and I think there is a 
place for them, no matter how good the officials are•. 
Officers were equivocal in their opinion of board members. Al-
though critical of their performance, they did not think members were 
unnecessary. While officers could be sceptical of the value 
they accepted the need for some form of lay input in health service 
management and decision-making. One Treasurer's views were reasonably 
tYPical of what officers in Alpha and Beta generally thought of mem-
bers: 
One must have public participation in such exercises 
(i.e. health service management) but my experience to date 
both of regional hospital boards and health boards would 
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tend to suggest that health board members find it 
very difficult to appreciate a total problem. They 
tend to look at isolated problems and discuss these fully 
because they understand them and know of them. It may 
be that we don't give correct information to members. 
On the facts that I have it is easier to get through 
the board a large chunk of expenditure than it is to 
get through a few hundred pounds. Are members educat-
ed properly into providing the sort of function they 
should be providing? Are members given the knowledge 
which would enable them to ask the correct questions? 
They are required to monitor us. They are required 
to take policy decisions. Are they educated to take 
policy decisions? Do they know how to? They get no 
education ..• to enable them to take a decision. They 
learn as they go along. Perhaps we're not teaching 
them properly. You can't give members too much in-
formation or they become swamped. But you have to 
give them enough to look at the whole problem •.•. It's 
a difficult problem. I don't know if we as officers 
are enabling members to exercise their prerogative. 
Although officers valued board members in a broad sense as being in a 
position to exercise some form of accountability to the public for the 
way in which the NHS is run ('members at times have a humanising 
effect'), they did not look upon members as being in a position to 
exert much influence on decision-making. 
Concluding Comments 
Evidence in regard to the board member's role suggests that there 
exists considerable uncertainty and 'mismatch' between prescribed prac-
tice and actual practice. Much of the responsibility for this lies 
with the appointment system. Nominees to health boards come from sec-
tional interests and may be expected, rightly or wrongly, and occ-
asionally or frequently, to push, or to ally themselves with, these 
interests. The dichotomy between, on the one hand, the official role 
of board members and, on the other hand, the backgrounds and exper-
iences of those who become members has led to some confusion among 
members concerning their purpose, or raison d'~tre. 
From official statements one could be forgiven for thinking 
that health boards, as the governing authorities, would be quite in-
fluential. But the reality leads one to a different conclusion. In-
terviews with members indicated strongly that perhaps the role de-
signed for them is not one that can ever be adequately performed by 
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part-time voluntary lay members (it is even doubtful i£ it could be 
performed by part-time voluntary ~-laymen). It may be that the role 
requires rethinking since the present demands upon members are, in 
many cases, not only beyond their capacities, but are also beyond 
preferences. Moreover, what is irrefutable is the imbalance which ex-
ists between the know-how o£ professional members and the relative 
ignorance o£ lay members, even allowing £or the £act that the latter 
may possess use£ul skills. A similar imbalance is also evident in the 
relationship between lay members and permanent o££icers. What is more, 
in an attempt to overcome their ignorance, board members in Alpha and 
Beta were likely tohse sight o£ their prescribed role as they became 
more involved in detail and in day-to-day administrative concerns. 
This, in turn, placed them in a sensitive position vis-a-vis local 
health councils, thus compounding their role confusion. 
Solutions to some o£ these di££iculties can be separated into 
two tYPes: the macro, structural re£orm kind, and the micro, low 
pro£ile, process kind aimed at altering behaviour. Those o£ a macro 
persuasion £avour separately elected health authorities or a merger 
between health and local authorities. But whether either o£ these 
solutions would do much to combat the problems described in preceding 
sections is doubtful. I£ appointed boards are to continue, as seems 
certain, then more attention should be £ocused upon what members can 
usefully contribute to policy-making. This means considering micro-
level changes aimed at introducing counterpressures into the decision-
making arena. Moves o£ this kind are more urgent than ever given the 
Government's preference £or a more local health service and given the 
prevailing public spending climate where choices in all policy £ields 
have been sharpened by cuts. While the NHS has emerged reasonably un-
scathed £rom these, its growth rate is minimal and insu££icient to 
£und many new developments. This has far-reaching implications £or 
various categories o£ user, particularly those in historically under-
funded sectors like the elderly, the mentally ill and mentally handi-
capped. While there are also pressures on acute services, these ser-
vices have been given a much higher priority over the years. 
The key to resolving the dilemma that has existed since 1974 
with the attempt to separate the policy £unction £rom the administra-
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tive one, leaving members to look a£ter the £ormer while managers £o-
cus on the latter, may be to encourage members to £eel less comprehen-
sive responsibility £or the internal management o£ the Service and 
more concern £or the current and £uture impact o£ health services on 
the community. The misleadingly managerial orientation o£ early o££i-
cial statements may have introduced too much overlap into the o££icer-
member relationship. Health authorities {and members) exist to 'legi-
timise local autonomy' - to provide open arenas £or political debates 
about health policy rather than to act as instruments o£ management 
and planning. ( 32 ) They should, therefore, be concerned with providing 
the means £or communication and consultation between the health ser-
vices and the communities they serve and with securing community supp-
ort £or decisions on priorities and changes. Members will remain in-
volved in strategic policy-making and in allocating resources between 
competing needs, but they will operate in a context o£ relating priori-
ties to community needs rather than to management needs. 
In addition, a range o£ initiatives might be launched which would 
assist members in the performance o£ their role. 0£ particular impor-
tance is an initial training programme to introduce new members to 
the structure o£ the NHS and their duties and responsibilities within 
it. Training should not be regarded as a one-o££ event and members 
should be given regular opportunities to re£resh their knowledge. 
In-service courses could be made available £or this purpose, supple-
mented by 'on the job' learning through the medium o£ study groups 
and seminars on issues o£ concern in an area. Also, project or task 
groups might be more appropriate than standing committees which not 
only divert authority £rom the £ull board but which o£ten have insu-
££icient business to occupy them. O££icers should be required to pre-
sent members with a wider range o£ options than is customary in order 
to promote debate. This process could be facilitated by providing 
members with more relevant information in the £orm o£ programme bud-
gets {which has been tried in Grampian Health Board) which would show 
members where resources were being channelled by moving away £rom the 
'shopping list' mentality. (33 ) More controversially, members may be 
helped in their task by having access to sources o£ advice and informa-








Select Committees draw on expert advice to challenge the views of go-
vernment departments and civil servants. Finally, health authorities 
could be required to produce annual reports setting out what they have 
been doing including impact statements on how their actions have aff-
ected the health of the populations they serve. 
These counterpressures,which may offset the grosser imbalances 
influence between members and officer~ will not have an immediate 
effect and must be pursued with the utmost vigour if they are to 
succeed. The obstacles to be overcome are considerable. Decision-
making and priority-setting processes in boards are characterised by 
a small number of key participants (i.e. officers at area and distr-
ict levels} who determine how available funds are to be spent with 
minimal lay involvement. This might just be defensible if the 
process was complex and technical. But much of it involves political 
judgements concerning priorities. Significantly, while accepting the 
value-laden nature of priority-setting, one administrator is of the 
opinion that the obstacles to worthwhile lay participation are so 
great that 'decisions about priorities will, of necessity, be made by 
professionals - administrative, medical or political - even if this 
introduces an element of paternalism'. (34 } These comments are direct-
ed primarily at Local health councils but they have a direct bearing 
on the feelings of frustration experienced by many board members in 
Alpha and Beta and elsewhere. Such views must be resisted at all costs. 
Whether in the NHS, local government or elsewhere, as Cornford has 
written, 'the moves to strengthen public scrutiny, control, initiative 
and participation have been cautious, reluctant and trivial in com-
parison with the growth of administrative power'. ( 3S) How to reverse 
this trend remains a challenge facing not only the Scottish Health 
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